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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0O0 
MCCUNE & MCCUNE, et al. 
Plaintiffs 
Appellants 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE, 
Defendant. 
MCCUNE & MCCUNE, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
Petitioners 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ARGUMENT FOR REPLY TO THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, APPELLANTS 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING REBUTTAL: 
RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OP THE FACTS 
Mountain Bell attempts to cloud over the fact that this 
case precipitated from an original and still pending case in the 
Third Judicial District Court. The District Court case was 
stayed pursuant to mutual stipulation of the parties after 
Mountain Bell had asserted the District Court did not have 
primary original jurisdiction to hear "certain" matters raised in 
the District Court suit. A resolution of all questions as to 
what and what is not the primary and original jurisdiction of the 
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Case No. 860049 
(Category 9) 
REPLY BRIEF 
PSC regarding the claims raised by Plaintiffs against Mountain 
Bell and others is respectfully requested from the Supreme Court. 
Otherwise, both the parties and the District Court will remain in 
a quandry as to the proper division of responsibilities. 
As for the findings, they speak for themselves, and it 
seems quite presumptuous for Mountain Bell to attempt through its 
recital of its own version to embelish them with comments which 
have no basis in the facts. Such phrases as "following a normal 
billing cycle", "receiving and investigating a complaint", 
"Mountain Bell discovered", "as part of a comprehensive reorga-
nization of the general exchange tariff", "did not explicitly 
permit", "because the tariff did permit cross-billing between 
business accounts", "account for business service", "facing the 
prospect of disconnection of his individual business service", 
and "to determine the validity and applicability of the tariff 
provision under which Mountain Bell was proceeding" need to be 
seen by the honorable justices of the Supreme Court for what they 
are — charicatures of the true matters of fact and an attempt by 
Mountain Bell to cloud over and camoflauge real issues and insert 
desired "facts" which are not clearly facts in this matter. 
Particularly, there is no specific evidence creating the clarity 
of the facts as charicatured by Mountain Bell. 
Mountain Bell has also, in reciting the tariffs regarding 
transfer of accounts from one account to another, attempted to 
insert facts not in the record regarding dates of tariffs and the 
entire paragraph on page 5 of Mountain Bell's brief beginning 
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with "This tariff provision was part of a comprehensive revision 
of basic exchange tariffs..." and ending with "McCune's Complaint 
in the Public Service Commission was filed on March 7, 1985, " is 
not supported by credible evidence in the record and the record 
made reference to does not support the charicatured serf serving 
allegations attempted to be asserted in the honorable justices' 
minds to be the proven facts. 
Moreover, it doesn't matter beans when the PSC complaint 
in this matter was filed as it pertains to the tariff in effect 
on transfer of accounts on the date of filing the PSC complaint. 
The valid law in effect when an "action arises" is the time when 
pertinent regulations, statutes, common law, case law, and 
constitutional provisions in existence at the time the action 
arose must be considered. 
RESPONDENT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mountain Bell makes a statement in its second paragraph 
of summary of arguments that, "This Court should accord 
considerable deference to the Commission's decision on this 
question involving the application of law (the tariff) to 
specific facts." This is a misguided statement not addressing 
the true law in existence in this state regarding review of PSC 
actions and the correct nature of regulations ("tariff" being 
just a mystifying word unique to the public utilities industry 
for a good old fashioned regulation, and one fashioned and 
written by the utility itself to boot in most instances). 
Regulations, first of all, are law only to that extent they 
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comply with constitutional and statutory law enacted by the 
people. Regulations are just what they say they are, provisions 
to carry out the provisions of paramount consitutional and 
statutory law. If a regulation runs contrary to the supreme 
constitutional and statutory and interpretive case lawf the 
regulation is nothing more than a bunch of words without power, 
void, dead, and improper. 
In addition, Mountain Bell tries very hard to avoid this 
honorable Supreme Court's precedent which states that this 
honorable Supreme Court takes no deference to the PSC's reasoning 
when general constitutional and other law is concerned. See 
previously cited Big K Corp v PSCf 689 P2d 1149 (Utah 1984) and 
Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v PSCf 658 P2d 601 (Utah 
1983). General law and constitutional law applies here because 
the transfer tariffs in question here are applicable to legal 
business entities and individual non-business-conducting-citizens 
and Mountain Bell is attempting to self legislate itself around 
the general law pertaining to partnerships and other business 
entities and their sanctity as distinct separate legal entities. 
Other reasons why general law is directly at issue exist. 
The third paragraph of Mountain Bell's summary of 
arguments states that consitutional rights were not violated 
using the attempted scapegoat that there was no "state action", 
but Mountain Bell has completely attempted to close the Supreme 
Court's eye to the existence of our own state Consitution1s same 
standards — indeed even broader standards — giving all of the 
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residents and citizens of this great state the right to due 
process, equal protection, and all of the other fundamental 
rights enumerated in our Utah State Consitution and cited on 
pages 23 and 24 of Appellants' Brief. Alsof to treat partners 
differently in the law in the carved out situation of public 
utility services is unequal isn't it? If we can say it is 
something equal, I am dumbfounded regarding the logic. Mountain 
Bell also summarizes in the same paragraph that the "interpre-
tation" of the pertinent tarriffs were just and reasonable. 
Mountain Bell is trying to say the PSC took a proper look at the 
tariffs involved and construed them as they should be and looked 
at them consitutionally and legally by holding up established 
case law to them and they stood the muster. That is just not so. 
The PSC went on an irrational trajectory away from the proper 
course, never considered Josephson v Mt. Bell's mandates 
established as case precedent law in this state in 1978, never 
looked at the definition of "customer" in the tariff defining 
"customer", never applied the hardened steel principles of 
partnership liquidation and personal partner liability, and 
rather overlooked the distinctions between monopolistic public 
utilities and businesses in the free marketplace. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT, POINT I. 
Mountain Bell starts out in its first argument point on 
page 7 by trying to show the PSC interpreted the tariff on 
transfer of accounts from one telephone number to another by 
"necessary implication" and found it was just and reasonable. 
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Plaintiffs agree that the PSC has the power to approve, suspend, 
or modify tariffs and rules and regulations filed by a public 
utility. Plaintiffs further have no qualms about the PSC's 
emphatic duty to do so. This must bef however, so that the 
regulations and practices of public utilities conform to law, 
both statutory and case law and constitutional law. See 54-7-20 
OCA 1953 cited on page 17 of Appellants1 Brief. 
The PSC was asked and it had a duty to decide if the 
tariffs in question were lawful, constitutional, just, reason-
able, proper, adequate, or sufficient and if they are not to 
prescribe rules and regulations which are, including establishing 
methods to be observed, furnished, enforced, and employed. See 
54-4-7 OCA 1953 cited on page 15 of Appellants1 Brief. Did the 
PSC do this. No, not by the longest shot in this world! 
The PSC should have but it shirked its responsibility. 
It evidentally needs to be counseled and schooled more closely 
regarding its duties more thoroughly by the people through the 
voice of their Supreme Court. 
Mountain Bell goes on on page 9 of its brief to try and 
get this honorable Supreme Court to let Mountain Bell legislate a 
unique and prejudicial tariff for itself and to allow the 
misguided judgment of the PSC regarding interpretation of the 
transfer of accounts tariffs to be given deference. But as 
previously stated, general law and consitutional law applies here 
and the PSC should have applied it but it did not or did not 
desire to apply it. Mountain Bell's rationale would allow them 
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to create their own lawf as they are trying here, without 
question — the same as a despot — not a public utility subject 
to a higher degree of responsibility to individual citizens and 
businesses than the regular free enterprise businesses. Mountain 
Bell is trying to get the Supreme Court to look away, but the 
Supreme Court will look straight at the matter as the PSC should 
have done. 
On page 11 of Mountain Bell's brief, the telephone 
company argues that partners are liable for partnership debt. 
But they do not deny that the principles about partnerships 
established in concrete in this nation do not allow partners to 
become personally liable to execution until after partnership 
assets are looked to first. Mountain Bell's illogical reasoning 
is that just because the individual sole proprietor to whom the 
partnership bill was attached was a customer of Mountain Bell, 
Mountain Bell could assess the partnership bill to him. 
The above illogic would mean anybody can be liable at 
Mountain Bell's whim for any bill they choose. The tariff on 
"customer" definition does not say anything of the kind. In 
fact, it is consistent with the general law recognizing the 
distinctness of sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, 
and government agencies when it comes to contracts and who is 
responsible for them. The complete language of the tariff 
defining "customer" reads: 
A personf firmf corporationr or governmental agency 
responsible for paying the telephone bills and for 
complying with the rules and regulations of the 
Company. A2.2.1, Mountain Bell Tariffs. 
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"Customer" is the legal entity as can be seen from the 
definition. The person (a non-business involved individual or a 
sole proprietor), a firm (partnership), corporation or government 
agency are responsible. The PSC should have strictly construed 
this definition tariff but they did not. 
Josephson v Mt. Bell requires them to do so, however. See page 
16 of Appellants1 Brief and page 852 of the Josephson decision. 
A partner, though secondarily liable if there are not 
enough partnership assets to satisfy partnership debt, is not the 
"customer" when it is a partnership telephone account. There is 
no dispute in fact that the telephone bill transferred was 
originally a partnership debt. See R2 and 90. 
On page 13 of Mountain Bell's brief, it talks about cost-
effectiveness but there was no evidence submitted proving any of 
the assumptions stated by Mountain Bell. As previously cited in 
Appellants1 Brief, such cannot be considered by the PSC. See 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. PSC, 152 P2d 542 (Utah). The PSC also 
inserted certain "facts" not in the record through their 
misguided reasoning focused on rates and customer cost. But 
there really was nothing at all presented in the way of evidence 
to show how many times the telephone company would have to resort 
to civil courts to collect accounts, particularly against 
partners of partnerships. Nor was there any evidence presented 
at all about costs to the consumer which would have to be passed 
on if traditional civil courts were used from time to time such 
as small claims and the like. There just wasn't any evidence. 
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But Mountain Bell and the PSC ande its administrative judge 
assumed some assumptions which have no basis in any facts proven 
at hearing. 
On page 13, Mountain Bell also talks about "policy" 
generally towards "customers". But the customer in this parti-
cular fiasco was the partnership — not the partner who had the 
partnership bill tacked on to his sole proprietor account without 
Mountain Bell first having complied with the partnership law 
requiring looking to partnership assets before going to task to 
deprive the partner of personal property. 
Mountain Bell continues on page 13 to say the account is 
undisputed. That is not so. It says that there should also be 
an explanation of why the partnership account has not been paid. 
If it had pursued the matter as it was legally required, it would 
have a right to find out why by determining partnership assets. 
It has not. If Mountain Bell thinks it will lose the account by 
virtue of the statute of limitations, this fault is Mountain 
Bell's for failure to use the regular judicial process to 
liquidate a presently contingent claim. It still could file a 
civil suit to determine liability in the courts if it would. 
On page 14, Mountain Bell states Plaintiffs did not order 
a copy of the transcript and therefore must rely on the pleadings 
and documentary evidence. There is no merit to such an argument. 
The transcript will be before the court by the time this matter 
is to be decided and to disallow reviewing it would be a travesty 
of justice. The rules provide that the record will be prepared 
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by the administrative agency and submitted. The secretaries at 
the PSC had a duce of a time even determining who took the 
record, who was the court reporter, and this was way after the 
fact when Plaintiffs checked with the PSC to see why the record 
had not been prepared and sent. In fact, to this date, it has 
not been determined who the court reporter is who recorded the 
pre-trial conference held prior to the regular hearing. 
The prejudice and bias is clearly manifested in the 
record and the PSC shows its improper feelings through their very 
commentary in the orders. Moluntain Bell is greatly false 
when it says the evidence and material facts were the only 
consideration of the administrative judge and the PSC. The fact 
that the claimant or any of them are from one profession or 
another has no bearing on the matters. Considering it and 
letting it influence one's passion is prejudicial in and of 
itself. It would be good for the judicial branch to remember the 
statue of justice with her eyes blindfolded more regularly in 
their striving for objective consideration of issues by consid-
ering only those facts germane to the issues. 
As far as an advisory opinion goes for aid to the 
District Court, all that Appellants desire is for a clear and 
crisp pronouncement to be made for the aid and guidance of the 
district courts, parties, and PSC as to whether the* disconnection 
and transfer tariffs are to be determined valid by the PSC before 
a party can pursue a money damages claim involving conduct 
pertaining to the types of action at least purportedly covered by 
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them. Must an aggrieved party complaining against a public 
utility be required to have a determination of the validity of a 
tariff or practice of a public utility first determined by the 
PSC before it can initiate and follow through with a damage suit 
in regular district, circuit, or justice of the peace courts? 
Please answer this question for us. 
On the top of page 16 of its brief, Mountain Bell states 
that the PSC cannot interpret. But at the first of its brief it 
argues to the opposite that the PSC has the power to interpret. 
Mountain Bell concedes and even asserts at the beginning of its 
brief that the PSC is the one to interpret tariffs. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON POINT II. 
Mountain Bell argues against constitutional violation but 
the Utah Constitution does apply, even if the federal due process 
clause does not. Plaintiffs feel both apply. To hold that they 
do not is to beg the question. The federal case cited by 
Mountain Bell pertaining to the 14th Amendment states that, "The 
mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not 
by itself convert its action into that of the State." There is 
much more than state regulation here. A public utility is not a 
regular business that is merely subject to state regulation 
through licensing, etc. The Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 
case, 419 US 345, 350 (US 1974) has been misquoted by Mountain 
Bell. 
Equal protection is still a right violated because, as 
stated previous, to hold otherwise means that public utilities 
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can disregard the distinctions in law and privileges and 
responsibilities of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and 
corporations and associations, etc. and be allowed the singular 
privilege of disregarding the procedural requirements established 
because of those distinct business entity creations and get away 
with it. Plaintiffs deeply trust that such misplaced irrational 
views will not become supreme law in this state. 
On page 17, Mountain Bell argues the transfer tariffs in 
question are just and reasonable. The one in existence in 
January 1985 was just, reasonable, and lawful as a correct 
statement of the law as far as it went but the one in existence 
at the time Josephson came down in 1978 and the one Mountain Bell 
so cleverly and disceptively had placed back on the books after 
this dispute came to fruition, are not. They run entirely 
contrary to the ruling in Josephson. 
As for the question of whether business accounts should 
or should not be allowed transferred to personal residence 
accounts, the resitation of several cases running contrary to 
Josephson, our state's law, is a mere rehashing of the question 
already reviewed and decided by this honorable Utah Supreme Court 
in Josephson v Mountain Bell in 1978. An equal number of cases 
holding the opposite view were considered by our court in 
Josephson and the conclusion reached, as stated on page 18 of 
Appellants1 Brief and pages 852 and 853 of the Josephson 
decision, the "sounder view" is that it is improper to transfer 
business accounts to private residence accounts. This is people 
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oriented law and in keeping with the worthy protection of 
fundamental rights. It is the best view (the sounder view) and 
is and should remain the law in this great state of Utah. 
RESPONDENT'S CONCLUSION 
Mountain Bell has avoided drawing any more attention to 
the illogical reasoning of the administrative judge regarding 
"denial of credit" which disregarded the distinctions between 
monopolistic public utilities and regular business in the free 
enterprise system. 
It hangs its hat on the assertion that partners are as 
liable as a partnership for partnership debt but fails to counter 
the rock hard law that individual partner property cannot be 
resorted to prior to exhaustion of partnership assets or at least 
an attempt to execute on partnership assets. 
True, a partner is ultimately liable on partnership debt, 
but this is the main distinction between a sole proprietorship 
and a partnership. A partnership is a separate distinct legal 
entity in and of itself. A sole proprietor merely does business 
through his own or assumed or pseudonyms. The sole proprietor is 
immediately responsible and subject to execution for his just 
debts but partners are insulated from immediate execution by the 
requirement that partnership assets must be used first before 
partners can individually be resorted to to come up with any 
remaining just partnership liability. Public utilities are no 
exception and are not exempt from the law and particularly the 
procedural and equality standards of our constitutions, 
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Expediency is not what is to be sustained by the judicial system. 
Justice is to be sustained which is founded upon fundamental 
principles of constitutional creation. Judicieil interpretation 
of the constitutions and the statutory and common law are to be 
observed, not circumvented. Mountain Bell has used a sneaky 
course of action in an attempt in this instance and many others 
to avoid the clear legal mandate of Josephson. They should be 
stringently reprimanded for such conduct. 
The tariff in existence on January 1985 is the proper 
tariff which should be reinstated to govern the transfer of one 
telephone account to another. And, if the telephone company or 
other public utilities are not content to use the inexpensive 
small claims and other civil court systems when it comes to 
recovering partnership accounts, then the remedy is not to take 
the law in their own hands and to become a law unto themselves 
but to promulgate additional provisions for the transfer tariff 
consistent with law and constitutional standards providing a 
process whereby the rights of individual partners will not be 
infringed and partnership assets will be looked to prior to any 
resort to the tactics which have been used by Mountain Bell and 
its agents and officers and employees in this case. It is 
respectfully requested that the arguments of defendant Mountain 
Bell and the faulty process of the PSC be disregarded, that the 
proper tariff be reinstated, that directions be given on how 
involved the PSC must become when disputes arise between utility 
recipients and the utilities before damage actions may move 
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forward in the regular civil courts, and what constitutional 
standards should apply. 
Dated this 30th day of July, 1986. 
V^ fry respectfully submitted, 
'k"~ 
Georde" M. McCune 
Pro 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 B r i e f t o Fioyd 
Commission, State o £ ^can, xo"
 Tlllv i986. 
Utah 84145, on this 30th day of July 198b. 
